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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
David Leroy Lee appeals from the district court's order denying his motion 
to strike surplus language from the judgment of acquittal entered after the Idaho 
Supreme Court vacated his conviction for failing to register as a sex offender. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
As a result of a prior conviction for lewd conduct with a minor, Lee is 
required to register as a sex offender and to bi-annually confirm his address with 
the sex offender registry (the "Registry"). State v. Lee, 153 Idaho 559, _, 286 
P.3d 537, 538 (2012). In October 2001, Lee avoided the registration 
requirement by absconding parole and, ultimately, leaving the country. Is!:. He 
was arrested in Belize in May 2009 and was thereafter extradited to Idaho, 
where the state charged him with failing to register as a sex offender in violation 
of I.C. § 18-8309. Lee, 153 Idaho at _, 286 P.3d at 538. Following a trial, a 
jury found Lee guilty of the charge. 19.:. The Idaho Supreme Court overturned 
the conviction, however, holding there was insufficient evidence presented at trial 
to support the jury's finding that Lee violated the registration requirements of I.C. 
§ 18-8309 which, the Court held, only required Lee to notify the Registry of a 
change of address within Idaho or to another state, not to another country. Lee, 
153 Idaho at _, 286 P.3d at 539-40. The Court therefore vacated the 
judgment of conviction and remanded the case to the district court "with 
instructions for the entry of a judgment of acquittaL" 19.:. at _, 286 P.3d at 541. 
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On remand, the district court entered a "Judgment of Acquittal After 
Remand," the body of which states: 
The defendant was convicted after a trial by jury of the 
offense of Failing to Register as a Sex Offender. He registered in 
Idaho, cut off his ankle monitor and fled and was eventually located 
in Belize after traveling in the United States. The Court of Appeals 
affirmed the conviction by its Opinion No. 38 filed June 29, 2011. 
The Supreme Court overturned that decision by its Opinion No.1 09 
filed July 5,2012. Based upon the Supreme Court's decision and a 
remittitur having entered, the verdict of the jury is vacated and a 
judgment of acquittal is entered. Because he is a serious 
pedophile, it is hoped that the authorities will be able to keep a 
closer watch on him in the future. As mandated, a judgment of 
acquittal is entered. 
(R., p.?) 
Lee thereafter filed a "Motion To Strike Surplusage In Judgment Of 
Acquittal After Remittitur," requesting the district court to remove the following 
language from the judgment of acquittal: "Because he is a serious pedophile, it is 
hoped that authorities will be able to keep closer watch on him in the future." (R., 
pp.8-15.) In support of his motion, Lee argued that the district court lacked both 
subject matter jurisdiction and authority under I.A.R. 38 to make "any findings of 
fact about Mr. Lee and his level of risk" or "to give any veiled orders to the 
'authorities' on how to properly supervise him." (R., pp.9-13.) Alternatively, Lee 
argued that the inclusion of the challenged language in the judgment of acquittal 
violated his right to due process. (R., pp.13-14.) The district court denied Lee's 
motion to strike, reasoning: 
The Court entered the Judgment of Acquittal as required by 
the remittitur. He prevailed on appeal because of the Supreme 
Court's interpretation of the statute but after he had been 
sentenced, after he had a presentence report prepared and he had 
been given an opportunity to challenge all the information 
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contained in that report so he was afforded due process. He is 
subject to a duty to register which pre-existed this case. 
Presumably, the Parole Board will have access to all of the 
information generated as a result of the defendant's prior offenses. 
The record is abundantly clear that the defendant is a risk to 
children. The Motion to Strike is denied. 
(R., p.16.) Lee timely appealed. (R., pp.117-20.) 
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ISSUES 
Lee states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Lee's motion to 
strike surplus language declaring him to be "a serious 
pedophile" in need of "closer watch" by the authorities from 
the judgment of acquittal because, under the language of 
the remittitur, it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to make 
such factual findings? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. 
Lee's motion to strike surplus language declaring him to be 
"a serious pedophile" in need of "closer watch" by the 
authorities from the judgment of acquittal because, in doing 
so, it failed to act consistently with the legal standards 
applicable on remand? 
3. Did the district court violate Mr. Lee's right to procedural due 
process when, without notice or a hearing, it declared him to 
be "a serious pedophile" in need of "closer watch" by the 
authorities? 
(Appellant's brief, p.4.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Has Lee failed to show that the district court exceeded its subject matter 
jurisdiction and/or the authority granted to it by LA.R. 38 by including in 
the judgment of acquittal language that, while superfluous, has no legally 
binding effect? 
2. Has Lee failed to establish any right to procedural due process in relation 
to the district court's statement that Lee is "a serious pedophile" where 
such statement was based on Lee's pre-existing duty to register as a sex 




Lee Has Failed To Show That The District Court Lacked Jurisdiction And/Or 
Authority Under I.A.R. 38 To Include In The Judgment Of Acquittal Language 
That, While Superfluous, Has No Legally Binding Effect 
A. Introduction 
Lee challenges the denial of his motion to strike, arguing as he did below 
that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and/or authority under 
I.A.R. 38 to include in the judgment of acquittal language that Lee "is a serious 
pedophile" over whom the district court "hoped that the authorities will be able to 
keep a closer watch ... in the future." (Appellant's brief, pp.5-8.) Lee's argument 
fails. The district court complied with the Idaho Supreme Court's directive to 
enter a judgment of acquittal, and it did not exceed its jurisdiction and/or 
authority under I.A.R. 38 by including in that judgment of acquittal language, that 
while superfluous, has no legally binding effect. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"A claim that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction presents a 
question of law over which [the appellate courts] exercise free review." State v. 
Peterson, 153 Idaho 157, 160,280 P.3d 184, 187 (2012) (citing State v. Savage, 
145 Idaho 756, 758, 185 P.3d 268, 270 (Ct. App. 2008); State v. Parvin, 137 
Idaho 783, 785, 53 P.3d 834, 836 (Ct. App. 2002)). 
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C. The District Court Did Not Exceed Its Jurisdiction And/Or Authority Under 
I.A.R. 38 By Including In The Judgment Of Acquittal Superfluous 
Language With No Legally Binding Effect 
On remand from an opinion of the Idaho Supreme Court, the trial court 
has jurisdiction to carry out the directive of the appellate court and may take 
additional action only "if the action concerns a matter that is a subsidiary issue 
fairly comprised in the disposition of the case." Walters v. Industrial Indemnity 
Co. of Idaho, 130 Idaho 836,838,949 P.2d 223,225 (1997) (citing J.R. Simplot 
Co. v. Chemetics International, Inc., 130 Idaho 255, 258, 939 P.2d 574, 577 
(1997)); accord State v. Hosey, 134 Idaho 883,886,11 P.3d 1101, 1104 (2000); 
Hummer v. Evans, 132 Idaho 830, 833, 979 P.2d 1188, 1191 (1999). "Where 
the appellate court remands a cause with directions to enter judgment for one of 
the parties, the judgment of the appellate court is a final judgment in the cause, 
and the entry thereof in the lower court is a purely ministerial act." Mountain 
Home Lumber Co. v. Swartwout, 33 Idaho 737, 197 P. 1027 (1921), quoted in 
Hummer, 132 Idaho at 833, 979 P .2d at 1191; Walters, 130 Idaho at 837, 949 
P .2d at 224. "A trial court has no authority to enter any judgment or order not in 
conformity with the order of the appellate court." kL. 
The principle that, on remand, a trial court must comply with the mandate 
of the reviewing court is also embodied in Idaho Appellate Rule 38(c). That rule 
requires a trial court, upon receiving a remittitur issued upon a final appellate 
opinion, to "forthwith comply with the directive of the opinion." I.A.R. 38(c); State 
v. Bosier, 149 Idaho 664,667,239 P.3d 462, 465 (Ct. App. 2010). 
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In Lee's prior appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court vacated Lee's conviction 
and remanded the case to the district court with directions to enter a judgment of 
acquittal. State v. Lee, 153 Idaho 559, _, 286 P.3d 537, 541 (2012). Upon 
receiving the remittitur, which specifically ordered the trial court to "forthwith 
comply with the directive of the Opinion" (#39107 Remittitur), the trial court 
entered a judgment acquitting Lee of failing to register as a sex offender (R., 
p.7). The court thus complied with the Idaho Supreme Court's directive. 
Lee concedes the trial court had jurisdiction on remand to enter the 
judgment of acquittal. (Appellant's brief, pp.5-7.) He argues, however, that the 
trial court exceeded its jurisdiction and/or authority under I.AR. 38 by including in 
the judgment of acquittal the language: "Because [Lee] is a serious pedophile, it 
is hoped that the authorities will be able to keep a closer watch on him in the 
future." (Id.) The state agrees the challenged language is superfluous; however, 
it is precisely because the language is superfluous and, ultimately, of no legal 
effect, that it is not jurisdictionally barred. 
In all the cases Lee relies on for the proposition that, on remand, a trial 
court cannot take any action beyond that directed by the appellate court, the trial 
court was either asked to take or actually took some action that was not only 
beyond that specifically directed by the appellate court, but was also of legal 
significance to the case. See Hosey, 134 Idaho at 885-86, 11 P.3d at 1103-04 
(on remand from appellate opinion directing reconsideration of suppression 
issue, district court had jurisdiction to consider defendant's motion to withdraw 
guilty plea because effect of appellate court's ruling under terms of plea 
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agreement was necessarily subsidiary to appellate court's directive on remand 
where defendant entered conditional plea); Hummer, 132 Idaho at 832-33, 979 
P.2d at 1190-91 (trial court lacked jurisdiction on remand from opinion directing 
entry of an amended judgment to consider plaintiff's renewed request for 
attorney fees); Walters, 130 Idaho at 837-38, 949 P.2d at 224-25 (on remand 
from appellate opinion reversing trial court's order denying motion to dismiss, 
trial court had no jurisdiction to consider plaintiffs motion to amend complaint). 
Lee has not cited any case, and the state is not aware of any, that holds a trial 
court exceeds its jurisdiction and/or authority under a remittitur by including in a 
judgment or order it was specifically directed to enter language that, while 
extraneous, is ultimately of no legal effect. 
In this case, the trial court took no legally significant action beyond that 
specifically directed by the Idaho Supreme Court. As required both by the 
Court's opinion and the remittitur that followed, the trial court entered a judgment 
of acquittal. That the trial court included in the judgment of acquittal its own view 
of the risk Lee poses to society does not demonstrate that the court exceeded its 
jurisdiction. The trial court's assessment was based on its own view of the 
record (see R., p.16); it was not an order, "veiled" or otherwise, that would 
compel law enforcement to take any particular action in its continued supervision 
of Lee (see R., pp.11-12 (defense counsel arguing in support of motion to strike 
that challenged language in judgment of acquittal constituted a "veiled order[] to 
the 'authorities' on how to properly supervise [Lee]"). 
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Because the language Lee challenges is of no legal significance, the 
district court did not exceed its jurisdiction and/or authority under I.A.R. 38 by 
including it in the judgment of acquittal. Lee has failed to establish any basis for 
reversal. 
II. 
Lee Has Failed To Establish Any Right To Procedural Due Process In Relation 
To The District Court's Statement That Lee Is A "Serious Pedophile" 
A. Introduction 
Lee argues that, even if the trial court did not exceed its jurisdiction and/or 
authority under I.A.R. 38, it nevertheless "violated his right to procedural due 
process when it declared him to be 'a serious pedophile' in need of 'closer watch' 
by the authorities." (Appellant's brief, pp.9-11.) Correct application of procedural 
due process principles to the facts of this case shows Lee's argument to be 
without merit. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The standard of appellate review applicable to constitutional issues is one 
of deference to factual findings, unless they are clearly erroneous, but free 
review of whether constitutional requirements have been satisfied in light of the 
facts found. State v. Cantrell, 139 Idaho 409, 411, 80 P.3d 345, 347 (Ct. App. 
2003). A claim that a defendant's due process rights were violated is a question 
of law, subject to free review. State v. Gilpin, 132 Idaho 643, 649, 977 P.2d 905, 
911 (Ct. App. 1999). 
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C. Lee Has Failed To Establish Any Violation Of His Right To Procedural 
Due Process 
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution provides that no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. 
Procedural due process requires that, except in extraordinary circumstances, "a 
person, whose protected rights are being adjudicated," must receive notice and 
an opportunity to be heard "at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." 
State v. Smith, 146 Idaho 822, 828, 203 P.3d 1221, 1227 (2009) (citations 
omitted). '''Where a person's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at 
stake because of what the government is doing to him, notice and an opportunity 
to be heard are essential.'" 19.:. at 826, 203 P.3d at 1226 (quoting Wisconsin v. 
Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971)). However, where an individual '''has 
already had a procedurally safeguarded opportunity to contest'" a particular 
finding, no additional process is due. 19.:. at 828, 203 P.3d at 1227 (quoting 
Conn. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 7 (2003)). 
Applying the foregoing principles in Smith, the Idaho Supreme Court 
struck down as violative of procedural due process a statutory scheme governing 
the designation of convicted sex offenders as violent sexual predators (VSP). 
Smith, 146 Idaho at 828, 203 P.3d at 1227. Specifically, the Court held that 
because designation as a VSP was based on a factual determination of probable 
future conduct and resulted in heightened and continuing legal obligations and 
registration requirements, due process required that an offender be afforded 
notice and a meaningful opportunity to challenge that designation. 19.:. The Court 
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was careful, however, to distinguish "Idaho's VSP system from a sex offender 
registry based solely on the fact of conviction of a predicate offense," explaining 
that, "[a]s to the latter, the United States Supreme Court has concluded that sex 
offender registration laws do not violate the offender's procedural due process 
rights, noting the offender 'has already had a procedurally safeguarded 
opportunity to contest' the charge.''' lil (quoting Doe, 538 U.S. at 7). 
Relying on Smith, Lee argues as he did below that, by labeling him a 
"serious pedophile" over whom the trial court hoped "authorities will be able to 
keep a closer watch ... in the future," the district court placed upon him a "badge 
of infamy" that triggered his right to procedural due process. (Appellant's brief, 
pp.10-11.) Lee is incorrect for two reasons. 
First, unlike Smith, whose VSP "badge of infamy" was based on a factual 
determination of future conduct, Lee has not been given any badge of 
designation not already fairly attributed to him as a result of his prior conviction 
for lewd conduct with a minor under 16 and the resulting requirement that he 
register as a sex offender. Indeed, as noted by the district court in its order 
denying Lee's motion to strike, Lee has already been afforded notice and an 
opportunity to be heard and to contest the facts giving rise to his prior convictions 
and his duty to register. (See R., p.16 (noting Lee was provided presentence 
report and had opportunity to challenge all information contained therein).) 
Second, also unlike the VSP designation at issue in Smith, the district 
court's statement that Lee is a "serious pedophile" and its expressed "hope" that 
authorities will supervise him more closely in the future does not impose upon 
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Lee any burden or consequence beyond that already required by his pre-existing 
duty to register. The statement was merely dicta and did not purport or operate 
to adjudicate any of Lee's protected rights. 
The district court's statement that Lee is a "serious pedophile" was not a 
new factual finding and does not deprive, or even threaten to deprive, Lee of any 
life, liberty or property not already at stake by virtue of his prior convictions. As 
such, Lee has failed to demonstrate that his right to procedural due process is 
even implicated, much less violated, by the inclusion of that statement in the 
judgment of acquittal. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's 
order denying Lee's motion to strike. 
DATED this 21 st day of May 2013. 
A. FLEMING 
Deputy Attorney Genera 
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